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ABSTRACT
Data integrity in computer-based information systems is
a concern because of the damage that can be done by
unauthorized manipulation or modification of data. While a
standard exists for data security, there currently is not an
acceptable standard for integrity. There is a need for
incorporation of a data integrity policy into the standard
concerning data security in order to produce a complete
protection policy. There are several existing models which
address data integrity. The Biba, Goguen and Meseguer, and
Clark\Wilson data integrity models each offer a definition of
data integrity and introduce their own mechanisms for
preserving integrity. Acceptance of one of these models as a
standard for data integrity will create a complete protection
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A. THE INTEGRITY PROBLEM
Data integrity in computer-based information systems is a
concern because of damages that can be done by unauthorized
manipulation or modification of data. Such manipulation or
modification can happen either maliciously or accidentally
when users access data and perform alterations. While the
historical emphasis in both military and commercial
environments has been placed on controlling access to
classified data, this control is effective in limiting
disclosure, arAd preventing unauthorized disclosure. However,
it is not a sufficient countermeasure to prevent manipulation
or modification by users of classified data. The emphasis on
controlling access to data has served to mask the issue of
data integrity. The data may be accessible only to authorized
individuals, but a mechanism to prevent users, both authorized
and unauthorized, from manipulating or modifying that data is
also needed. Manipulation or modification compromises the
data and, in many situations, can be more harmful than
disclosure to an unauthorized user. This raises the thought
that there needs to be a way to prevent, or at least detect,
unauthorized manipulation as well as unauthorized disclosure.
The Department of Defense (DoD) Trusted Computer System
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Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) document [Ref. 1], which
establishes policies and principles for data security, does
not address data integrity. The scope of this thesis is to
define the term data integrity, discuss and analyze three
existing data integrity models, compare them, and assess their
relevance to DoD applications.
B. INTEGRITY DEFINED
There are many definitions for integrity that are used
concerning protection of data. Each model presented in this
thesis uses a definition of integrity that has been
established by its author(s). For example, Biba [Ref.2:p. 13]
defines data integrity in terms of the performance of
subsystems that constitute a computer system. In this
context, Biba considers a subsystem to be a "subset of a
system's subjects and objects isolated on the basis of
function." Clark and Wilson [Ref. 3] define data integrity as
data that is free from unauthorized manipulation. While there
are similarities in the definitions and their applications,
they are different. The difficulty with the lack of an
accepted definition is that each author establishes guidelines
for what his model needs to do based on how the author himself
defines integrity. This makes the creation of a standard
extremely difficult.
Another definition of data integrity appears in
[Ref. 4:p. 335]. This definition covers six areas:
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a. How correct the information is thought
to be
b. Confidence level that the information
is from the original source
c. Correctness of the functioning of the
process using the information
d. Level of correspondence of the process
function to the designed intent
e. How correct the information in an
object is initially
f. Confidence that the information in an
object is unaltered
This definition appears to be comprehensive since it
covers all the areas that logically fall under the heading of
integrity. For instance, the ability to prevent unauthorized
manipulation of data is helpful only if the data is correct
when received. If it is known with a high degree of
confidence that the data is from the original document and it
is correct, then integrity must be mair lined. If the data is
altered in any way before it is received, and unfortunately
this may not be detectable, then maintaining integrity will do
nothing more than keep the data in its current incorrect,
altered state. The definition given above will serve as a
reference framework to examine the definitions of integrity on
which the three models are based.
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C. INTEGRITY CONCZERNS
A first concern associated with data integrity is the lack
of work done in this area as compared with the area of data
security. The TCSEC (Ref. 1], commonly called the Orange
Book, fully describes a set of criteria for protection of
classified information. This publication, however, does not
address data integrity in the detail it does for security,
thereby failing to establish guidelines for integrity
policies. The recent attention placed on data integrity is
due to a snifting of emphasis to the area of control of
sensitive but unclassified information, which has data
integrity as one of its main concerns. The main direction of
effort within DoD has been the control of classified data.
Security classifIcations are assigned that allow only those
individuals with a proper security clearance access to
classified, or controlled, data. Historically, controlling
access to data has been considered the main function of any
security system within DoD.
The lack of an accepted definition for integrity prevents
the development and eventual acceptance of a standard data
integrity model, which is a second problem area. As mentioned
earlier, the Orange Book has established guidelines concerning
data security and access control. A similar publication about
data integrity would create a standard definition and possibly
a standard model to be used for DoD applications. The models
presented in this thesis are compared and recommendations are
4
made based on what was learned through independent research,
not on an established guideline. This can lead to problems
because, just as in the case of defining integrity, many
different opinions can be stated and defended with no correct
answer as to which model best serves to maintain data
integrity.
D. APPLICABILITY
The idea of data integrity has been presented as a
legitimate problem that needs to be addressed. Given this,
the question now is who needs to be concerned with data
integrity. The answer to this question is that any business
or organization where there is more than one person with
access to data needs to be aware of data integrity.
Organizations that have a well- established security policy
cannot consider their policy complete unless it addresses
integrity as well as security and control. This is because
the manipulation of data is just as harmful as the
unauthorized disclosure of that data. The large number of
individuals accessing data within DoD dictates a need for a
standard integrity policy. The purpose of this thesis is to
determine which of the three models presented is most
appropriate for application to DoD environments.
This thesis presents the three data integrity models and
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each. Then, a
framework for comparison will be developed. This framework is
5
used to compare the models and to try to select one specific
model that best matches DoD needs. The models under
investigation are:
1. The Biba Model. [Ref.2]
2. The Goguen and Meseguer Model. [Ref. 5]
3. The Clark and Wilson Model. [Ref. 3]
6
II. BIBA INTEGRITY MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
The Biba Model [Ref. 2] is the result of work done for the
U.S. Air Force by the MITRE Corporation in 1977. A report
prepared by K.J. Biba presented the results of this research
project and became known as the Biba Model for system
integrity.
Biba develops his integrity model using the approach that
integrity is the dual of secrecy. He presents several
different policies for protection of integrity and tailors
each policy for implementation in a Multics environment. This
model is often mentioned as the dual of the Bell-LaPadula
Model, which is the quasi-standard for [Ref. 1].
B. DEFINITION OF INTEGRITY
The definition of integrity developed in the Biba model
addresses a computer system rather than the system data. Biba
defines system integrity as "a guarantee that a subsystem will
perform as it was intended to perform by its creator." This
definition covers the subsystems which combine to make up the
overall system. Biba uses the term "subsystem" to represent
any subset of a system's subjects and objects that has been
isolated based on functionality. An assumption is made by the
author that an external verification has been performed on any
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specific subsystem and that it is functioning properly. This
means that each subsystem, and therefore the entire system, is
in a state worthy of protection.
Biba points out that possession of the property of
integrity will not guarantee the absolute behavior of a system
or subsystem. He states that a system will behave as it was
designed if it has integrity. The system will perform up to
an established standard. The quality of the standard is
unimportant. As far as integrity is concerned it does not
matter what the system does as long as it behaves according to
its design.
As mentioned above, Biba's definition of integrity
addresses system components instead of specific data. The
process that each subsystem executes is the target of Biba's
model. The goal of this model is to prevent unauthorized
manipulation of subsystems thereby safeguarding their ability
to behave in a manner that is within their design
specifications.
Biba's focus on system and subsystem behavior allows him
to identify specific threats to system integrity.
Preservation of each process in its initial state (possessing
the property of integrity) will ensure that the functionality
of the entire system is within design constraints.
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C. DESCRIPTION
A basic premise of the Biba model is the concept of "no
read-up, no write-down" between different integrity levels.
These actions can violate the integrity of data at specific
integrity levels by allowing users, subjects, or processes to
access information for which they are not cleared. A user,
subject, or process which is authorized to access low-
integrity level data should not be able to access, or read,
high-level data. Also, low-level data should not be allowed
to enter into any process which uses high-level data. Low-
level data has a greater possibility for unauthorized
manipulation and therefore it can be contaminated. High-level
data can likewise be contaminated if low-level data is allowed
to enter into a process using the high-level data. This
restriction prevents a low-level authorized user from
accessing high-level data and possibly destroying the
integrity of that high-level data.
The "no write-down" constraint prevents high level data
from being written to low-level object This eliminates the
possibility of destroying the integrity of high-level data by
allowing access to unauthorized subjects. High-level data
cannot be written down to processes which use low-level data.
Data used in high-level processes must remain at the high-
level classification and is authorized for use only by other
high -level processes.
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Biba implements his "no read-up, no write-down"
restriction through the application of two classes of
integrity policies: mandatory controls and discretionary
controls. These two classes constitute the framework of the
Biba model. The policies within each class are discussed in
this section. The mandatory policies are presented first
followed by the discretionary policies.
A mandatory policy is one that reflects the idea that
"certain functions, central to the enforcement of the policy,
are designed as a fundamental characteristic of the system"
[Ref. 3:p. 187]. These are requirements that cannot be
bypassed, avoided, or altered by users. Each policy under the
category of mandatory must fulfill two requirements. The
first is that the policy must identify the objects that
require protection. The second is that the policy must
determine when requests to access data are permissible. This
is the access control for the system. Each of the three
policies presented by Biba meets these criteria. The policies
use different constraints to limit data access while
identifying protected objects for the system.
Throughout his model, Biba refers to subjects and objects
when discussing the integrity constraints within each policy.
Biba defines a subject as the system element which performs
data accesses. He defines an object as those system elements
which are accessed. These definitions apply for each
10
occurrence of a subject or an object in the different
integrity policies, both mandatory and discretionary.
Biba uses classification levels for integrity that are
applicable to either military or commercial environments. The
classifications of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential
[Ref. 1] can be used but are not the only possibilities.
Labels such as High, Medium, and Low can be assigned to
objects within the policies discussed by Biba.
1. Mandatory Integrity Policy
a. Low-Water Mark Policy
The Low-Water Mark Policy is based on the premise
that the integrity level of the subject is dynamic and will
change based on its previous behavior. The integrity level of
the subject will be determined by the integrity level of the
most recently accessed object. The integrity level of the
objects in the system will not change. The data in the
objects remains at a constant level with the collection of
subjects permissible to access those objects constantly
changing.
In this policy it is possible for a subject to
downgrade its own integrity level to the lowest level in the
system, hence the name low-water mark. Access to the lowest
level objects will decrease the integrity level of the subject
to the lowest level. This is the biggest drawback of the
policy. The subject that reduces its own integrity level to
11
the low-water mark can only be restored to a higher integrity
level by reinitializing the entire system. This is obviously
not an event that should occur frequently. The policy allows
for altering integrity levels downward but it does not allow
subjects to increase their integrity level.
The Low-Water Mark Policy is depicted in Figure 1.
In this figure, the subject (Si) possesses a High integrity
level before it accesses object 02. This means that Si is
authorized to access objects that are labelled High (such as
01). When Si expands its domain and attempts to access 02 the
following occurs. First, the access is granted and second, Si
is assigned an integrity level of Medium. This results from
the fact that the level of 02 is Medium. S1 has downgraded
its own integrity level from High to Medium by requesting and
being granted access to 02. 01 is now out of Si's domain and
can not be accessed by Si. Any subsequent actions by Si to
access objects with lower integrity levels than 02 (i.e. Low)
will result in the integrity level of Si being further
reduced. The goal of this policy is to prevent the indirect
sabotage of object integrity by subjects.
b. Ring Policy
The Ring Policy is designed to address attempts by
subjects to directly modify objects. This policy fixes the
integrity levels of both subjects and objects and holds these
levels constant. This policy increases the flexibility of the
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system by allowing observation of objects at any level.
Subjects are allowed to observe any object, even those objects
which possess a higher integrity level than the subject. The
trade-off for increased flexibility is decreased integrity
assurance. Observation of all objects by all subjects
increases the possibility of contamination of data contained
in high-level objects.
The Ring Policy allows universal observation of
objects but puts constraints on the ability to modify objects.
The only modifications allowed are those attempted by a
subject on an object that has a less than or equal to
integrity level. This prevents low-level subjects from
modifying higher-level objects. The subjects can observe the
higher-level objects but can not modify these objects. This
policy is demonstrated by the example in Figure 2.
In Figure 2, a subject Si has the ability to
observe an object at any integrity level. S1 can observe
objects 01, 02, and 03 but can only modify those objects which
are at an equal to or less than integrity level, specifically
02 and 03. This shows that S can modify 02 and 03 but does
not have the ability to modify 01. All three objects are
within the domain of S1 because of Sl's ability to observe the
objects. Restrictions apply only to modification of objects
thereby maintaining the integrity of the objects.
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c. Strict Integrity Policy
The Strict Integrity Policy performs the same
functions as the Low-Water Mark Policy but it does so in a
different manner. The Strict Integrity Policy does not change
the integrity level of a subject. The Low-Water Mark Policy
prevents contamination of high-integrity objects by changing
the integrity level of subjects to the integrity level of the
object most recently accessed. The Strict Integrity Policy
forbids access by lower level subjects to a higher level
object. The subject's integrity level remains constant.
Access requests to levels which exceed the subject's level are
denied. The integrity levels of both subjects and objects are
static and are externally defined. The system itself can not
change integrity levels. Figure 3 illustrates this policy.
Subject S1 possesses an integrity level of Medium.
This gives S1 the ability to observe and modify objects at the
Medium and Low levels. In this case, S1 can observe and
modify objects 02 and 03. $1 does not have the capability of
observing objects at the High integrity level. Sl's level
will not change even though it may observe and modify lower
level objects. This constant subject integrity level is the
difference between the Strict Integrity Policy and the Low-
Water Policy.
The Strict Integrity Policy can be summarized by
saying that a subject may read an object if that object's
integrity level is greater than the subject. Additionally, a
14
subject may write to an object if that object's integrity
level is less than or equal to the subject's level
[Ref.6:p. 204].
Before Si After SI
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2. Discretionary Integrity Policies
Discretionary controls can be modified by a user, or
group of users, who is placed on an authorization list which
specifies the ability to alter discretionary controls. A user
has the ability to define his own integrity controls after
access to an object is made, thereby making the controls
discretionary. Two discretionary policies discussed by Biba
are Access Control Lists and Rings.
a. Access Control Lists (ACL)
An access control list is a defined set of subjects
that are authorized to access a specific object. Each object
within the system has its own access control list. This
mechanism is discretionary because the list of subjects can be
modified by an authorized user. Certain users, such as system
administrators, have the authorization to dictate which
subjects are allowed acces: to which objects. This is based
on the present integrity levels of both the subjects and the
objects.
The use of access control lists creates the problem
of identifying those subjects that are authorized to modify
the ACL. This problem can be solved by externally defining
those subjects with modification authozity and maintaining
this list of authorized subjects at a minimum level. Fewer
subjects with modification authority means less opportunity
for either inadvertant or malicious sabotage.
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Figure 4 illustrates the use of an access control
list to enforce integrity constraints. Subject Si has the
ability to observe and modify objects which are within its
domain, specifically 01 and 02. This is allowed because the
ACL for 01 contains Si. The ACL for 02 contains both S1 and
S2 thereby authorizing each of the subjects access. 03 has an
ACL which contains S2. Each object can be accessed only by
those subjects that are contained within their access control
list.
b. Rings
The ring policy described here is similar to the
ring policy used in mandatory controls with the exception that
the access privileges of subjects can be modified. The
integrity of objects is protected by allowing modification
only by subjects within a specified integrity ring.
Figure 5 illustrates the use of rings. A ring
(domain) is established for each subject. The subjects can
observe or modify only those objects that are within their
respective ring. This figure shows that the rings may overlap
as 01 is within the rings of both S1 and S2. Objects that are
outside a subject's ring are not accessable by that subject.
19
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A first strength of the Biba model is that it was the
first attempt to identify integrity as the dual of secrecy.
Biba takes the Bell-LaPadula Model, which is concerned with
the unauthorized disclosure of information, and creates a
similar model which addresses unauthorized manipulation of
information. The Biba model was one of the first models to
identify integrity as a topic seperate from secrecy.
A second strength of the Biba model is that it offers a
variety of policies for both mandatory and discretionary
controls. This variety increases the probability of
successful integration of an integrity policy as part of a
security plan. Each of the policies has different
requirements and specifications which may or may not fit into
the design of a security plan. The designer of the plan has
more than one option available when deciding on an appropriate
integrity policy.
Z. WEAKNESSZS
The Biba model is designed for implementation in systems
featuring ring architecture, especially the Multics' kernel
system. The policies are tailored for this system and are not
applicable for implementation using anything other than
Multics.
22
While approaching integrity as the dual of secrecy, the
Biba model ignores the topic of secrecy. The Bell-LaPadula
Model, which is the basis for DOD secrecy policies, does not
completely address integrity. Biba attempted to fill this
void but has ignored a discussion of secrecy. Formulation of
a plan for implementing an integrity policy into a plan for
secrecy is needed to create a security policy that can be
considered complete.
The policies presented by Biba are not flexible enough for
implementation in real-world applications. The policies are
not only too Multics specific but are also not capable of
being altered to fit into systems that do not meet the
specifications for each policy.
Some of the policies presented by Biba have problem areas
that make implementation difficult. These problems are
mentioned in the sections discussing each policy. Further
work is required to correct these deficiencies before the
policies can be put into use.
23
III. GOGUEN AD MESZGUZR INTEGRITY MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
A second data integrity model was presented by Goguen and
Meseguer. Their model builds on the concepts of inference
control and unwinding. Each of these will be explained
separately in this chapter. The model is applicable for a
simple multilevel security (MLS) system. A MLS system is one
that has different security levels and can prevent users from
obtaining information for which they lack authorization
[Ref.l:p. 114]. The goal of the model is to verify the MLS
system by verifying its internal components. The internal
components, or processes, must be capable of meeting the
security and integrity requirements of the system. If these
internal components do not meet the requirements, then the
overall system can not function in a secure state.
B. DEFINITION OF INTEGRITY
The definition of integrity applied by Goguen and Meseguer
is based on the idea that there are certain operations, or
processes, that are performed on data that must be invisible
to certain users. Integrity of the system is maintained if
processes do not allow viewers to infer anything about the
data by observing the process itself. Integrity is maintained
through the use of non-infering processes.
24
This explains how integrity is maintained but it does not
define the authors' idea of integrity. There is no clear
definition by the authors of how they view integrity. The
most appropriate definition of integrity for application of
Goguen and Meseguer's framework is the traditional integrity
definition, which is that the data is free from unauthorized
manipulation and can be modified only by authorized processes.
There is likewise no definition of integrity offered by the
authors in their 1982 article (Ref. 7].
C. DESCRIPTION
Goguen and Meseguer have designed their model for
application in a multilevel security (MLS) environment. They
use two approaches for maintaining integrity: unwinding and
inference control. These approaches will be examined
separately in this section.
1. Unwinding
The authors view multilevel security as existing in
three levels of abstraction. This view is helpful in
establishing a definition for the term "unwinding".
Progression from one level to another level is accomplished
through the process of unwinding. Unwinding leads from one
level of abstraction to another with the requirements for
proof of the integrity policy becoming increasingly more
general rather than specific. Each step of the unwinding
process goes further away from human intuition and serves to
25
verify the ideas and constraints of the previous level. This
unwinding is a logical progression and ensures a security and
integrity policy that is both accurate and complete. In the
context of the authors' model, the term security policy refers
to a complete policy that encompasses both disclosure control
and integrity concerns.
The first level of abstraction in a multilevel
security system is the precise statement of the security
policy that is to be implemented. This level is closest to
human intuition and is a direct expression of the constraints
that the security policy needs to enforce. The authors state
that this level is the actual expression of the security
policy.
The second level of abstraction is obtained by using
the authors' unwinding theory to remove the security policy
one step away from human intuition. This level consists of
the statement of general conditions that must be met by the
security policy. The authors write that this hopefully
reduces the proof of the policy to simpler conditions and
makes guaranteeing the correctness of the policy easier.
The third level of abstraction is the most removed
from intuition. This level consists of the statement of a
finite set of lemmas, or assumptions, that are obtained by
analyzing the specifications of the security policy. The
assumptions are used as verification that any system is
multilevel secure. If all of the assumptions are true than
26
any system that meets the specifications established by the
assumptions is guaranteed to be multilevel secure. This level
is based on the idea that if the assumptions are derived
through a logically sound procedure, then the problem of
proving certainty for any system that meets the assumptions is
greatly reduced. This is designed to reduce the requirement
for rigorous mathematical proof of system completeness and
certainty.
While unwinding can be applied to any security policy
the authors demonstrate the application of this technique
within the MLS environment. They include in their article a
detailed description of each level of abstraction with a MLS
security policy. The final result reached by the authors in
the MLS case is that unwinding is the formulation of simple
conditional equations that describe "the effects of operations
on the basic data structures that underlie the system"
[Ref.5:p. 81]. Verification of these data structures against
specifications by algebraic definitions leads to verification
of the entire system.
2. Inference Control
Inference control is preventing high-level classified
information from being inferred by combining data at a lower
classification level. The authors design their model to
prevent users from violating a security policy by an
aggregation of data. This is done by defining and
27
establishing boundaries for a logical system and then defining
inference relationships that exist between the entities within
the system.
Each process within the logical system has a view of
the entire system and, in some cases, the process may have a
subview. This view is simply the components of the system
that a process accesses, or sees. Each process uses data at
appropriate integrity levels and is certified to be valid by
mathematical proofs. The user, or operator, of the process
should possess an appropriate security level clearance to
match the classification level of the working data. The view
afforded by the process needs to be based on a least privilege
concept in that the process should see only that which is
essential for proper functioning. The least privilege concept
states that the view afforded each process should be large
enough to allow functionality while being small enough to
prevent unauthorized data from being accessed. Assignment of
a limited view to each process will reduce the possibility of
inference of high-level data from lower level data.
Similar to unwinding, the authors go through a
rigorous proof for inference control in a MLS environment.
They define a logical system and apply rules and constraints
to enforce inference control. The final result of the
authors' work in the MLS example is that inference control can
be attained within a relatively simple environment but there
does not exist a standard technique that can be applied to
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more complex security environments. Inference control is
difficult to attain in complex systems and requires a great
deal of effort with no guarantee of success.
D. STRENGTHS
A first strength of the Goguen and Meseguer model is that
it addresses two areas that were not addressed by either
Clark/Wilson or Biba. The authors provide two specific
measures for ensuring data integrity rather than providing a
general approach to the entire system.
A second strength of this model is that it is designed for
application in an MLS environment, which is the traditional
military standard for security policies. Both unwinding and
inference control are designed for implementation within MLS.
This offers the advantage of having available a working system
for implementation if it is needed.
A third strength of Goguen and Meseguer is that the
authors have developed rigorous proofs for both unwinding and
inference control. The proofs are presented along with the
assumptions, or lemmas, to provide for verification and
completeness of the authors' policies.
z. WZADUSSES
The Goguen and Meseguer article has two weaknesses that
can hinder its acceptance and eventual implementation.
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A first weakness is the lack of a definition of integrity
to be applied to the unwinding and inference control
approaches. The concepts of how to maintain security and
integrity are throughly presented but a statement of what
integrity means should be included. The reader must apply his
own definition of integrity to the article. The authors of
the two previous models, Clark/Wilson and Biba, present
definitions of integrity in their articles. These authors see
integrity in different ways and apply their respective
definitions to their model. Goguen and Meseguer fail to
supply their view of what integrity actually is.
A second weakness is the degree of difficulty and
complexity involved in presenting the two concepts developed
in the article. The detailed and complete proofs mentioned
above as a strength may likewise be labelled a weakness. The
article relies heavily on work previously presented by the
authors in 1982 and which is almost required reading in order
to understand the concepts presented in the article.
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IV. CLARK\WILSON INTEGRITY MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
The Clark\Wilson Integrity Model makes a comparison
between military and commercial security policies and takes
the findings of this comparison to formulate a model that can
be used to preserve data integrity. The authors clearly
distinguish between the needs of the military and commercial
environments concerning data integrity and use the Department
of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (Orange
book) [Ref. 1] to set standards for their model.
B. DEFINITION OF INTEGRITY
Clark and Wilson define "data integrity" as data that is
free from unauthorized manipulation and is in a valid state.
Free from manipulation means that users, auchorized or
unauthorized, have not altered the data in any way. This
concept can be expanded even further to say that users do not
have the ability to alter the data.
The concept of validity will be discussed in detail later
but, briefly, it means that the data is in the same unaltered
condition that it was in when it was received. The separation
of duties and well-formed transaction mechanisms are used to
ensure this validity. The Clark\Wilson model builds on the
differences between military and commercial policies and
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applies the definition of integrity just given to develop
their model.
C. DESCRIPTION
The Clark\Wilson Integrity Model is built on the premise
that ensuring integrity is a two-part proce3s. The two parts
of this process are certification and enforcement. Both of
these terms are used in reference to data that must be
protected against manipulation. The formulation of
constrained data items (CDIs), integrity verification
procedures (IVPs), and transformation procedures (TPs)
provides the basis for establishing rules for developing and
implementing the model.
The Clark\Wilson Model begins by identifying Constrained
Data Items (CDIs). A Constrained Data Item is a data item
which needs to be covered by the model. It is a data item to
which the model is applied. Verification that the CDIs are
within the constraints of the data integrity model is
accomplished by Integrity Verification Procedures, or IVPs.
The IVPs ensure that the data is in a valid state before any
operations are performed with the data. Transformation
Procedures (TPs) are those procedures that move CDIs between
valid states. They are used to change the collection of CDIs
that correspond to each valid state. Moving from one valid
state to another valid state will change the applicable CDIs
and this change is performed by a TP or set of TPs. The TP is
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used in the sense of a well-formed transaction in a commercial
integrity model. By allowing only TPs to change CDIs, the
integrity of each CDI is ensured
The term constrained data item is derived from the
requirement that only a TP can alter the data. When the CDIs
meet the requirements of the integrity policy then a condition
known as a "valid state" arises. CDIs will be continuously in
a valid state if they are altered only by TPs. The TPs take
the CDIs from one valid state to another and thereby maintain
data integrity.
Enforcement of the requirement that only TPs manipulate
CDIs can by accomplished by the system. The validity of the
initial IVP, which confirmed that the CDIs met the integrity
policy requirements, and the validity of the TPs can only be
accomplished by a trusted user (i.e. security officer). This
verification is done by comparing the IVP and each TP against
the integrity policy that is in use. This two-step process is
the basis of the Clark\Wilson Model. Enforcement of the TP
requirement by the system and certific- ion of each TP by the
security officer are the two steps in the model.
Clark\Wilson develops a set of rules for both the
certification and enforcement requirements. These rules are
presented below.
There are five rules concerning certification and four
rules concerning enforcement. Certification rules are
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labelled Cl - C5 and enforcement rules are labelled El - E4.
These rules are given in order of implementation.
(Cl): IVPs are required to ensure that all CDIs are in
valid states when an IVP is executed.
(C2): All TPs must be able to take a CDI from one
valid state to another valid state thereby
ensuring integrity of the CDI.
(El): The system must ensure that only TPs are allowed
to manipulate CDIs. Also, there needs to be a
relationship created which identifies a user with
the TPs that are available for that user as well
as the CDIs that the TPs are allowed to access.
These three rules are concerned with the internal consistency
of the CDIs. The requirements specified by these rules are
met by the proper functioning of the system. Enforcement is
also accomplished by the system.
(E2): The relations developed in El must be stored by
the system so that users are only capable of
accessing those TPs for which they are authorized.
(C3): The relations that are created by El and stored by
the system in E2 must meet the requirements of the
integrity policy.
(E3): The system must be capable of capturing the
identification of each user and verifying that the
user is allowed to use only those TPs for which he
is cleared.
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These rules develop the requirement for each user to be
identified upon initial access to the system so that only
appropriate TPs are available. This limits access to TPs and
therefore, CDIs to authorized users.
(C4): All TPs must be capable of writing to a write-only
CDI the information that is necessary to
reconstruct the TP if required. This creates a
"log" to record the occurrence of each TP as well
as the design of the TP itself.
Rule C4 establishes an audit trail for each TP. Pertinent
information about each TP is captured so that independent
reconstruction of the TP is possible. This creates a log to
serve as a document for audit.
The next rule (C5) addresses a component of the model that
has not been previously mentioned. This component is the
Unconstrained Data Item, or UDI. An Unconstrained Data Item
is a data item which is not covered by the integrity model.
UDIs are important because they represent the most common
method for entering new data into the system. The authors
give the example of a user typing information at a keyboard.
This shows that a TP can accept unconstrained data as input
and then alter the value of certain CDIs based on these UDIs.
Rule C5 is necessary to provide for certification of UDIs.
(C5): A TP must be capable of taking a UDI as input and
transforming that UDI into a valid state CDI. If
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this can not be done then the UDI must be rejected
by the TP.
The final rule (E4) prevents a user from creating a TP and
then executing that TP without any certification taking place.
Enforcement of this rule prevents bypassing the certification
requirements.
(E4): An individual with the ability to certify IVPs or
TPs must not be capable of executing those same
IVPs or TPs.
The combination of these rules forms the basis of the
system. The enforcement rules, which the authors correspond
to the application-independent security functions, and the
certification rules, which correspond to application-specific
definitions for integrity, define the system. The authors
desire to place as much responsibility as possible on the
enforcement rules thereby limiting the certification
requirements. This is desireable because of the complexity of
the certification process compared to the enfo.ccement
capability of the system.
D. STRZNGTHS
Clark\Wilson has been acknowledged as a new approach to
defining and maintaining data integrity. There has been a
great deal of follow-on work which takes the basics of
Clark\Wilson and attempts to refine the model for
implementation with specific computer systems. This follow-on
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work has served to highlight some of the strengths of the
model. These strengths are presented below.
The definition of integrity used in Clark\Wilson relates
to integrity as a concept within the context of a computer
system. Their model offers a working definition that is
applied effectively to the area of computer data. The model
supports the definition offered and builds a framework that is
targeted at maintaining integrity within the scope of the
authors' definition.
A second advantage of Clark\Wilson is that it identifies
the features of a computer system in which integrity is the
main goal. The model provides a blueprint for basic rules
that must be established and implemented in systems that are
used to maintain integrity. Adherence to the rules
established in the model will allow the construction of a
valid, working integrity mechanism.
A third strength of Clark\Wilson is that it can be used to
expand the Department of Defense Orange Book security model to
cover the topic of integrity as well as control of classified
data. The model has potential for implementation within DOD
systems if it is adopted under the guidelines of the Orange
Book. The model can be used to compliment the security model
constructed by the Orange Book.
A fourth strength of Clark\Wilson is its applicability to
the non-DoD environment. This model is easily understood by
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the commercial world and has the potential for commercial
applications as well as DoD applications.
Z. WZAKNZSSES
There are several criticisms concerning weaknesses in the
Clark\Wilson Model. The following three areas show the most
significant weaknesses that have been detected by critics.
A first weakness of the Clark\Wilson Model is its
inability to have the integrity controls strictly internal
[Ref. 8:p. 1-7]. The dual process of certification and
enforcement takes into account both the environment internal
and external to the system. The enforcement is accomplished
internally by the system itself while the certification is
performed externally by a security officer. This means that
the system will maintain the integrity of data that has been
verified externally before being entered. The system may
accept data that has been entered incorrectly by either
accidental or malicious means. External verification declares
the data to be in a valid state. The system accepts the data
and maintains its integrity. There is not a mechanism within
the system to check the correctness of the data that has been
input. Certification and enforcement are not both internal to
the system.
A second weakness of the Clark\Wilson Model is that, by
requiring IVPs, the model needlessly complicates the
certification process. As mentioned earlier, it is desirable
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to shift as much of the verification responsibility to
enforcement because enforcement can be done by the system.
Since an IVP is essentially a special type of TP the
requirement for IVPs is redundant [Ref. 8]. This redundancy
contrasts to the authors desire to use minimal certification
rules because of the level of complexity and the manual work
necessary for certification.
A third weakness of Clark\Wilson is that it is applicable
only at a single level of granularity, which is the size and
resolution of the protected system elements [Ref. 9:p. 270].
The author of [Ref. 9] has developed rules concerning
integrity policies and how they relate to the level of
granularity. The dominant rule developed is that at each
level of granularity, the integrity policy should specify how
the state may change in terms of the next lower level of
granularity. As it is presented, Clark\Wilson is designed for
use at a single granularity level. The inability of the model
to be implemented in a multi-granular environment limits its
range of applicability.
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V. A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter establishes a framework for comparing the
data integrity models. The framework is fully developed and
justified before being applied in Chapter VI. It is designed
so that each model can be evaluated individually with the
results being used to make recommendations concerning the
suitability of the respective model for DoD applications. In
Chapter 6 this framework is applied to the three models
presented in the earlier chapters to determine whether the
Clark/Wilson, Biba, or Goguen and Meseguer data integrity
models should be adopted as a formal standard.
B. FaIEWORK DZSCRXPTION
The framework provides a means for comparing the models on
a common basis. Since each model addresses data integrity
from its own unique approach, establishment of a common ground
is based on generic, rather than specific, areas. The areas
examined in the framework are:
1. The definition of integrity used in the model.
2. Concepts on which the model is based.
3. Suitability of the model for DoD applications.
4. Advantages and limitations of model.
The proposed framework is presented in Figure 6.
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1. Definition of Integrity Used in Model
- Adequacy/Completeness
- Assumptions
2. Concepts on Which Model is Based
- Central theme
- Relation to Secrecy
3. Suitability for DoD Applications
- Characteristics of DoD Environment
- Relationship of Model to DoD Environment
4. Advantages and Limitations
- Description of Strengths and Weaknesses
- Correction of Deficient 
Areas
Figure 6
1. Definition of Integrity Used in Model
a. Adequacy/Comploteneos
This area of analysis addresses the question of
whether the definition of integrity used in the model is
complete and adequate. This question cannot be answered until
a common definition of integrity is offered as a standard by
which each model's definition can be measured. Of many
existing definitions [Ref. 8], the definition that was
developed by the Integrity Working Group (IWG) of the
Invitational Workshop on Data Integrity [Ref. 8:p. A.1-2]
seems to best serve as a standard. This definition is:
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Integrity - a property that data, an
information process, computer equipment and/or
software, people, etc. or any collection of
these entities meet an a priori expectation of
quality that is satisfactory and adequate in
some circumstance. The attributes of quality
can be general in nature and implied by the
context of the discussion; or specific and in
terms of some intended usage or application.
This definition was selected as the standard for comparison
because of both its flexibility and its completeness. It
addresses many aspects that are commonly associated with the
notion of data integrity while remaining broad enough to be
applied to many environments.
A closer examination of this definition shows that it can
be broken down into the following key elements:
(1) "data, an information process, computer equipment
and/or software, people, etc. or any collection of
these entities." This prevents the restriction of the
definition to data integrity alone. This broadness
makes this specific definition a good tool for
comparison as many different aspects of integrity are
addressed. The axiom here is that the broader the
standard, the greater the number of definitions that
can be measured against it.
(2) "a priori expectation". This term emphasizes that
there must be a goal or desired outcome (i.e.
expectation) for the element being studied for
integrity. The outcome is based on theory instead of
experience or experiment.
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(3) "quality". This term refers to the attributes that
characterize the element being studied. The most
common attributes contained within the heading of
quality are accuracy, timeliness, consistency, and
completeness. Robert Jueneman [Ref. 8:p. A.5-14]
states that integrity is not quality but rather it is
the "extent to which the qualities (i.e., accuracy,
precision, timeliness, etc.) taken together are
considered adequate for a given purpose."
The definition of integrity offered as a standard will be
used to measure the appropriateness of the definitions
developed in the three data integrity models described in
earlier chapters. In this situation, appropriateness is
dependent on, and equated to; completeness. The completeness
of each definition is concerned with the aspects of integrity
that are addressed. It is not practical to expect every
existing definition of integrity to address all aspects
covered by the standard. Each definition must be evaluated
for completeness within the environment in which it is
employed as well as against the IWG standard.
Evaluating for completeness will highlight the aspects of
integrity that are addressed and, more importantly, those
aspects that are ignored. This will be useful when
determining whether the model that uses the definition is
suitable for DoD applications. The consequences of an
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incomplete integrity model can be assessed before acceptance
and implementation of the model.
b. Assumptions
When evaluating the integrity definitions in the
three models it is necessary to determine the assumptions, if
any, that the author(s) make. Assumptions can be made
concerning a great number of areas and, unfortunately, can
create a void that can hinder eventual acceptance of the
model. Each model will be examined for the assumptions that
it makes concerning its definition of integrity. The validity
of each assumption needs to be evaluated so that there are no
areas lacking support.
2. Concepts on which Model is Based
This section of the framework addresses two specific
questions:
(1) What is the central theme on which the model
is based?
(2) Is there any relation between the model and
secrecy?
a. Central Theme
The central theme of the model is important as it
will be useful in determining compatibility with DoD
applications. The basic theme of each model should be based
on sound, provable principles that make the model practical
instead of simply theoretical.
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Clark\Wilson builds on the premise of separation of
duties and well-formed transactions. The validity of this
premise will be evaluated for possible areas of omission or
conflict. Biba uses the "no read-up, no write-down" concept;
Goguen and Meseguer employ as a basis the concepts of
unwinding and inference control. These models will likewise
be evaluated for areas of omission and conflict.
A thorough evaluation of each model's basic
concepts is necessary before a decision can be made concerning
acceptance and implementation. Schell [Ref. 10:p. 89] points
out that the first step in planning any security system,
whether it addresses disclosure and manipulation together or
simply disclosure alone, is the ability to identify what the
system needs to protect. If the object requiring protection
is identified then a plan can be formulated concerning how to
provide the needed protection. This is the phase where
knowledge of the perspective models and their functioning
plays a key role. The question of whether a specific model is
appropriate can be answered accurately the model is studied
and understood.
b. Relation to Secrecy
The second question to be answered in this section
concerns the relationship between the data integrity model and
secrecy. This issue is important because of the possible
incorporation of the model into a complete security policy
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that addresses both disclosure and manipulation. The TCSEC
(Ref. 1] does not address manipulation of data and therefore
can be considered somewhat incomplete. Because the TCSEC does
not address integrity it is not possible to produce a "laundry
list" of requirements that a data integrity model should meet.
The TCSEC addresses confidentiality, which is the primary
concern in handling classified information. Once this problem
has been adequately addressed, emphasis turns to the problem
of controlling unclassified information. This is where the
issue of data integrity is a primary concern [Ref. 8]. For
completeness, the TCSEC needs to be updated to provide
guidance for protecting data from manipulation and thereby
preserving the integrity of the data.
An examination of the three data integrity models
in this thesis and their relationship to secrecy will
determine whether they can possibly be incorporated into the
TCSEC to fill the existing void.
3. Suitability for DoD Applications
This section of the framework examines the
applicability of each data integrity model for a DoD
environment. This is accomplished by first describing the
specifics of a DoD environment and then testing each model for
its goodness of fit to these specifics.
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a. Characteristics of a Military Environment/
Relationship to Model
A DoD environment is synonymous with a military
environment, which is the more common terminology. Military
environments are pl...imarily concerned with the protection of
classified data from unauthorized disclosure. Only recently
has attention been directed to the issue of protection from
manipulation.
The difference between a military environment and
commercial, or private, environment is in the goal of their
respective security systems. The military viewpoint is that
controlling access to data, specifically read access, is the
foremost goal of any security system. The commercial
viewpoint liffers from the military viewpoint in that the
emphasis is not on access to data but on prevention of data
alteration. This commercial viewpoint stresses integrity, not
secrecy [Ref. ll:p. 73]. The specifics of a DoD environment
dictate that a data integrity model be capable of
implementation within a multi-level security system.
Disclosure rules will separate data into different
classifications. Individual users authorized to access
classified data must be restricted in their capability to
modify that data. There need to be modification constraints
established at each classification level for each user. The
model should be able to attach integrity labels that are
similar to already existing classification labels.
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b. Relationship of Model to Military Environment
This area examines the ability of the model to
attach the proper integrity labels discussed above. The model
need not be restricted to the labels already in use in the
military security classification system (i.e. Confidential,
Secret, and Top Secret). Rather, the model must be capable of
attaching its own labeling scheme. The key point is that the
model can properly label data which reside at different
integrity levels, thereby restricting the operations that can
be performed on or with that data.
4. Advantages and Limitations
The advantages and limitations of each data integrity
model must be evaluated and understood before selecting a
model for implementation. This section will look at the
advantages and limitations discussed for each model in their
respective chapters. An examination of these areas will help
to answer the following questions:
(1) Will the weaknesses of the model prohibit
acceptance?
(G) Can areas of weakness be corrected or modified
to make the model acceptable for DoD
applications?
a. Description of Strengths and Weaknesses
The strengths of each model are important for
performing an analysis of benefits to be achieved by accepting
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the model. This will determine what voids in the current
security policy the model can fill.
While noting strengths is important, the emphasis
in this section is on limitations. This is because the
limitations of each model will be the deciding factor in
determining whether the model can be accepted and implemented
as a standard.
The limitations of each model will be examined for
the reasons given above. If the model has limitations that
make it unacceptable and these limitations cannot be
corrected, then the model will be inappropriate regardless of
its strengths. If the limitations can be corrected then the
model can be considered for acceptance.
b. Correction of Deficient Areas
This section examines the noted weaknesses of the
model and attempts to determine whether these weaknesses can
be corrected. The decision must be made concerning acceptance
based on a thorough evaluation of the model's weaknesses. If
the weaknesses cannot be overcome then the options available
to the decision maker are limited. The option of accepting
the model with modification is eliminated. If corrections can
be made, then analysis of the feasability of making these
corrections must be done. The corrections may involve
processes which excessively complicate the model and actually
create another weakness while solving the original weakness.
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C. rRAbUWO3K APPLICATION
The framework developed in this chapter will be used to
analyze each of the three data integrity models. The goal of
the framework is to provide a means for comparing the models
on a common basis. This comparison will be made in
Chapter VI.
After applying the framework to the models,
recommendations concerning acceptance can be formulated.





In this chapter, the framework developed in Chapter V is
applied to the Biba, Goguen and Meseguer, and Clark\Wilson
data integrity models. Each model is evaluated in the four
areas of the framework for the purpose of making
recommendations concerning suitability for DoD applications.
The models are evaluated simultaneously with each area being
examined before moving on to the next area.
B. MODEL COMPARISON
1. Definition of Integrity Used in Model
The definition of integrity used in each model is
examined for the purpose of determining its adequacy,
completeness, and assumptions. The definitions are measured
against the standard set by the definition which has been
adopted as a benchmark, namely the Integrity Working Group
(IWG) definition presented in Chapter -
Before examining each definition it is helpful to
restate the appropriate definition for each model as developed
in the respective chapter. These definitions are:
Biba: integrity is a system property which guarantees
that a system or subsystem will perform as intended by
its creator.
51
Goguen and Mesequer: integrity is based on the idea
that there are certain operations that are performed
on data that must be invisible from users. Integrity,
a property, is maintained if users are unable to infer
anything about the data by observing the processes
involving the data. This is based on the underlying
idea that data possesses the property of integrity if
it is free from unauthorized manipulation and can be
modified only by authorized processes.
Clark\Wilson: integrity is a property assigned to data
that is free from unauthorized manipulation and is in
a valid state.
a. Adequacy
Adequacy, as stated in the IWG standard, is
concerned with the areas of integrity that are addressed by
the definition. Adequacy is strongly related to the idea of
completeness. The IWG standard definition itself is both
adequate and complete as it addresses many of the areas
frequently associated with data integrity. Analysis of the
three models produces the following results:
(1) Biba. The Biba definition treats integrity as
a relative measure rather than an absolute. There is no a
priori statement concerning the performance specifications of
the system. Rather, the system need only perform to the
designer's intent, whatever that intent may be (Ref.12:p.60].
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This perspective makes the Biba definition
extremely broad. It places the responsibility for integrity
on the ability of the creator to design a system in which
integrity can actually be achieved. Because of this, the Biba
definition is lacking in specific detail and is general enough
to be applied to almost any system or subsystem. Flexibility
is present; standardization is missing. The conclusion from
this is that the Biba definition of integrity is adequate but
not complete.
(2) Goguen and Meseguer. The integrity definition
offered in the Goguen and Meseguer model addresses
noninference. This refers to the ability of the system to
"hide" the data from users working with certain processes. If
a user cannot infer anything about the data from the process,
then the system is said to have integrity. This definition
addresses neither the process nor the qualities of the data in
detail. There is an a priori expectation of what should
happen, specifically that the user should not be able to gain
knowledge from inference.
The Goguen and Meseguer definition is both
adequate and complete when applied in the appropriate context.
A system that has the ability to separate its objects from its
subjects is the most appropriate situation for application of
this definition. If, however, the system does not have this
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capability, then Goguen and Meseguer' definition is not well-
suited for implementation.
(3) Clark\Wilson. The Clark\Wilson integrity
definition is based on prevention of unauthorized manipulation
of data. Data that is in a valid state is maintained in that
valid state, thereby ensuring integrity, only if authorized
manipulations are performed on or with the data. This
definition is broad enough to be applied to many different
environments. There is no method addressed for determining
whether the data is initially in a valid state. The valid
state concept serves to isolate the data and label it as being
worthy of protection. This is essential in setting limits to
the items that need protection.
The definition used in Clark\Wilson is the most
useful of the three models because of its applicability to
many types of environments. This definition is complete in
respect to the IWG standard and as a result is quite adequate.
The conclusion reached in this section is that
the Biba ana Clazk\Wilson inte-rity definitions are adequate
in accordance with the IWG standard. The Goguen and Meseguer
definition is contextually dependent concerning adequacy.
b. Assumptione
The assumptions made concerning the integrity
definition in each model are analyzed to determine if the
definition is realistic. This is to check the relavion of the
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definition to the real world. Assumptions may be so great
that they make the integrity definition, and possibly the
entire model, potentially unacceptable for implementation in
any environment. Because of this, caution should be exercised
when making assumptions to accompany any data integrity
definition. Analysis of the three data integrity models
follows.
(I) Biba. The assumptions made in the Biba
definition are:
(1) The system being evaluated is designed in
such a way that integrity can actually be
achieved.
(2) There has been an external verification
performed on the system to ensure that it
is functioning properly.
(3) Classification labels exist for integrity
levels. These classification labels are
quite similar to the levels attached to
the security classifications used for
military information.
Each of these assumptions is based on sound
reasoning. The design of the system is irrelevant from the
Biba model perspective. Likewise, the external verification
is a realistic condition to expect before implementation of
integrity controls. The existence of integrity classification
55
labels is quite necessary and is not an unreasonable
expectation. The conclusion after examining these assumptions
is that the Biba definition does not stand on insupportable
assumptions and that each of the assumptions is both necessary
and reasonable.
(2) Goguen and Meseguer. There is only one
assumption made concerning the integrity definition used in
this model. This assumption is that the processes that users
can execute have been verified to be properly functioning. A
properly functioning process will not allow inference and
therefore will maintain the integrity of the data involved in
the process.
The assumption made concerning the definition
in this model is similar to the assumption made in the Biba
definition. Just as in Biba, this is a reasonable assumption
and does not make the integrity definition unacceptable.
(3) Clark\Wilson. The Clark\Wilson integrity
definition incorporates three assumptions. These are:
(1) Data is initially received in a valid
state. There is no mechanism available
within the model to test for validity, it
is simply assumed.
(2) The initial Integrity Verification
Procedure (IVP), which confirms that the
data items requiring protection meet
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certain conditions, is assumed to be a
valid process itself.
(3) It is assumed that the data item and the
real world object that it represents
correspond closely.
Each of these assumptions is acceptable with
the possible exception of the assumption concerning the
integrity of data upon its receipt. The assumption that data
is in a valid state, specifically that it is correct and in
its original form, creates a precondition that is not easily
met. It is somewhat unrealistic to assume that all data is
received in a correct state. Many things can happen to data
to change either its format or content. Designing a system
based on an integrity definition that requires received data
to be in a valid state is probably not the best approach to
addressing the data integrity problem.
The conclusion in this area of analysis is that
each of the models is based on sound, reasonable assumptions
that do not damage the model's credi. lity. The necessaryV
assumptions are not liabilities for any of the models.
2. Concepts on which Model is Based
This section examines the central theme of the model
and the relation of the model to secrecy. This is useful in
helping to determine compatibility with DoD objectives.
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a. Central Them
The central theme of the model is important as it
will be useful in determining compatibility with DoD
requirements. It also serves to determine whether the model
is practical or simply theoretical.
(1) Biba. The central theme of the Biba model is
the development of a hierarchical lattice which is used to
identify authorized users and also separate users by type
[Ref. 12:p.57]. This allows Biba to implement his "no read-
up, no write-down" restrictions. This system is effective in
preventing modifications by unauthorized individuals.
Biba implements his "no read-up, no write-down"
restriction through the use of both mandatory and
discretionary controls, which are described in detail in
Chapter II. There are integrity classifications within the
model which assign data to different levels. These
classification labels can be either military-oriented or
'ommercial-oriented. The use of mandatory and discretionary
controls along with the assignment of classification labels
support the central theme of this model.
(2) Goguen and Meseguer. The central theme of this
model is based on two concepts: inference control and
unwinding. The concept of inference, which is described in
detail in Chapter III, prohibits users from learning anything
about the data from the processes that they execute. This
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property places restrictions on the design of the processes
that can be used in a system implementing Goguen and Meseguer
integrity controls. Processes, whatever their purpose, must
be designed with the capability to hide the data that they
use. This may not be possible to accomplish for all
processes. The interactions of various processes must also be
capable of preventing inference to protect the integrity of
the data involved in those processes. This condition
complicates the design of even the simplest systems.
The second concept used in the Goguen and
Meseguer model is unwinding. This is the process of observing
an integrity mechanism from different levels of abstraction.
This unwinding begins with an examination of the policy to be
implemented and then looks at the "larger picture" of the
entire system, with each successive step in the unwinding
being further removed from intuition. This allows for
examination of a specific integrity policy or model with the
requirement of proof being focused on increasingly general
terms as the unwinding goes further from intuition.
(3) Clark\Wilson. The Clark\Wilson model is built
on two premises: the well-formed transaction and separation of
duty. A well-formed transaction is designed so that it allows
only authorized modifications of data. This transaction will
prohibit unauthorized manipulation, thereby preserving the
integrity of the data. Just as in the Goguen and Meseguer
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model, there is a requirement that the transaction, or
process, be designed in such a way that this well-formed label
may be applied. This is not a trivial matter, especially in
large scale systems.
The second premise in Clark\Wilson is
separation of duties. This is necessary to preserve a
correspondence between data objects and the real world objects
that they represent. This separation prohibits unauthorized
manipulation by breaking an operation into several subparts
and requiring that each of the subparts be executed by
different individuals [Ref. 12:p. 68]. In this way, no one
user can execute an entire operation. This will prevent
malicious tampering with the data with one exception, namely
when there is collusion among users.
The conclusion of this section is that the
central theme of the Biba and Clark\Wilson models is largely
practical, thereby making implementation possible. The theme
of the Goguen and Meseguer model is more theoretical and
lacking in implementation detail.
b. Relation to q.crocy
The relation of the data integrity model to secrecy
is important as it will be a factor in the decision concerning
acceptance for possible incorporation into the Orange Book.
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(1) Biba. The Biba model has the strongest
relation to secrecy of the three models analyzed. Biba takes
the Bell-LaPadula model and creates its dual for integrity.
The mechanisms in the Bell-LaPadula model are incorporated in
Biba thereby allowing for implementation of both models
simultaneously. The requirement for integrity classification
labels in Biba is matched perfectly with the security labels
developed in Bell-LaPadula. This ties an integrity policy to
a security policy, thereby creating a complete protection
policy for access control and modification control of data.
(2) Goguen and Meseguer. This model relates to
secrecy in that it has as its first step the development of
the security policy that is to be implemented. Integrity
controls can be a part of this policy. As unwinding takes
place, the policy is examined from an increasingly broader
viewpoint. Integrity mechanisms can be incorporated into the
overall security policy at any level of abstraction. As with
security, the integrity mechanisms rely on increasingly more
general requirements of proof as unwinding takes place. The
ability of the system to prevent inference is an integrity
mechanism that has a strong relation to the security of the
data. Access to data is controlled by the security policy.
The ability to prevent nference is controlled by integrity
mechanisms. If an unauthorized user is successful in gaining
access to data, then the integrity mechanisms will treat that
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user as an authorized user. The distinction between
authorized and unauthorized users is not made by the integrity
mechanisms. Rather, it is the responsibility of access
controls.
(3) Clark\Wilson. Clark\Wilson relates to secrecy
in that it has the ability to limit the data that a user can
access. This is a method of disclosure control. This model
uses separation of duties and well-formed transactions to
prevent one user from having the ability to execute all steps
of one specific process. This helps to preserve the integrity
of the data while at the same time establishing an access
control mechanism. Because of this feature, Clark\Wilson has
a strong relation to secrecy and also to the requirement for
access control that characterizes a secure military system.
The conclusion drawn from the analysis in this
area is that the Biba model has the strongest relation to
secrecy while the Goguen and Meseguer has the weakest. The
Clark\Wilson model is in the middle of the other two models.
3. Suitability for Military Applications
This section examines the applicability of each data
integrity model for use in a DoD environment, which is
described in Chapter V. The main area examined is the ability
of each model to attach proper integrity labels. The labels
are not restricted to the existing labels for access control
(i.e. Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret). It needs to be
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noted that there currently does not exist criteria for
determining integrity levels [Ref. 12]. Access control labels
exist, integrity labels do not.
(1) Biba. Biba's model presents several policies
for ensuring data integrity. His model has been designed to
be the dual of the Bell-LaPadula model, which is the standard
for military security classifications. Specifically, the
Strict Integrity Policy introduced by Biba is especially
suitable for DoD applications. In this policy, the integrity
of both subjects and objects is static and externally defined.
This policy uses mandatory controls and is quite similar to
the security classifications currently in use in DoD. As
such, it is one of the most promising of all integrity
policies for implementation within DoD, specifically within
the Orange Book.
(2) Goguen and Meseguer. The Goguen and Meseguer
model is adaptable to the requirement of integrity labels
because of its use of domain separation. This domain
separation is similar to the Access Cc- -rol Lists (ACL) usedp
in Biba's discretionary integrity controls. The term "domain"
is used to refer to the grouping of objects that a specific
user is allowed to access (Ref. 12:p. 61]. By restricting the
available objects, integrity of the system can be preserved.
This domain concept can be extended to cover the objects
available to a user based on the integrity level of that user.
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If the objects possess integrity labels, then access to these
objects can be limited to only those users with proper
authorization. This is similar to the access control
classification system used in the Orange Book. The result of
this capability is that the Goguen and Meseguer model has the
potential for success in a DoD application.
(3) Clark\Wilson. The Clark\Wilson model
recognizes the difference between commercial environments and
military environments. The emphasis in commercial
environments is on data integrity whereas the emphasis in
military environments is on disclosure control. The model is
designed with the intent to develop integrity controls for the
military environment. As discussed in Chapter V, the term
military environment is synonymous with DoD environment. This
characteristic of Clark\Wilson makes it extremely compatible
with existing DoD requirements and classifications for
disclosure. As it is written, Clark\Wilson is not designed to
attach integrity labels. The capability to do such labelling
would enhance its applicability to DoD environments.
Each of the models has the potential for
implementation of an integrity labelling mechanism with the
Biba model being the most promising of the three.
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4. Advantages and Limitations
The advantages and limitations of each model are
analyzed to help in determining suitability for DoD
applications.
a. Description of Strengths and Weaknesses
The strengths and weaknesses of each model are
given in detail in the appropriate chapter. This section
highlights the areas that either make the model more
acceptable or hinder its acceptance.
(1) Biba. The notable strength of the Biba model
is that it is the first attempt to treat integrity as the dual
of secrecy. This gives it a high degree of compatibility with
military security policies and models. This correspondence
allows for integration of Biba, specifically the Strict
Integrity Policy, into DoD standards for data protection.
The most limiting weakness of the Biba model is
its orientation to systems which feature ring architectures,
especially a Multics kernel system. This narrows the number
of systems which can implement the policies developed by Biba.
(2) Goguen and Meseguer. This model has as a
strength its approach to data integrity. Rather than
providing a general approach to an entire system, Goguen and
Meseguer provide two specific measures to ensure integrity.
These measures are unwinding and inference control. This
approach differs from the approach used in both Biba and
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Clark\Wilson and it offers procedures to be implemented to
ensure integrity.
The limitation of Goguen and Meseguer is that
it does not offer an explicit definition of integrity for
which the two methods of control can be applied. This creates
a void in the area of establishing a goal for the integrity
controls. In what state does the data need to be in, or what
characteristics does it need to possess in order to be
considered as having integrity. These questions cannot be
answered without a definition of integrity for the model.
(3) Clark\Wilson. The main strength of the
Clark\Wilson model is that it identifies the features of a
computer system in which integrity is the main goal. As
stated in Chapter IV, the model provides a blueprint which
includes basic rules t-hat must be established and implemented
in systems that desire to maintain integrity. The model
presents nine rules for enforcing integrity and the
combination of these rules forms a mechanism that will
consistently enforce integrity.
The most limiting weakness of Clark\Wilson is
that its requirement for Integrity Verification Procedures
(IVP' s) needlessly complicates the certification process. The
requirement that all procedures using the data be verified is
a necessary but complicated matter. This places a great deal
of emphasis on the process of certifying procedures before
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those procedures are executed and allowed to access the
protected data.
b. Correction of Deficient Areaa
This is an analysis of the weaknesses noted above
for each model and a determination as to whether these
weaknesses can be eliminated.
(1) Biba. The noted weakness of Biba is its heavy
orientation to ring architecture systems, thereby making the
model somewhat inflexible. However, this is not a weakness
that renders the model unacceptable for DoD application. The
feasibility of application to systems featuring other types of
architecture must be determined. The Biba model can be
adapted to other architectures without major modifications.
The principles of the model are valid for application to any
type of system, even though the specific details are not.
(2) Goguen and Meseguer. The lack of an
established integrity definition in the Goguen and Meseguer
model is a relatively minor limitation. Though the authors do
not supply their own definition, there are many possible
definitions of data integrity that fit into the context of
this model. This is a limitation that has no effect on the
possible acceptance of this model as a DoD standard.
(3) Clark\Wilson. The requirement of Clark\Wilson
that certification is needed for those procedures that access
protected data is its main limitation. This is a limitation
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that must be dealt with before acceptance. There is a real
need in this model for the procedures to be certified for
proper functioning. However, there is an assumption made that
the data in the model was received in a valid state and
therefore is worthy of protection. This assumption is
acceptable for the data but it is not acceptable for the
certification of the procedures. This limitation cannot be
overcome without having an adverse effect on the proper
functioning of the mechanisms in the Clark\Wilson model.
C. CONCLUSION
The framework developed in Chapter V has been applied to
the three data integrity models in order to determine their
suitability for DoD applications. The models were analyzed in
the four areas that constitute the framework with the results
shown in Figure 7. This comparison table shows the abilities
of each of the models in the four criteria areas.
After completion of the analysis, the following
conclusions have been reached:
(1) The Biba data integrity model is based on both an
adequate integrity definition and practical concepts.
This model is capable of implementation in a ring
architecture system, and with modification can be
implemented in a DoD environment.
(2) The Goguen and Meseguer data integrity model is based
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of integrity for application of the model's controls.
However, the model may be accepted for implementation
in DoD environments if further rk is accomplished to
make the model more practical.
(3) The Clark\Wilson data integrity model offers an
adequate integrity definition and is based on sound,
provable concepts. This model is well-suited for DoD
environments With the added capability of integrity
69
label attachment, this is the most practical model for
acceptance as a DoD standard.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RKCOIUHD&TIONS
A. CONCLUSION
The analysis performed in chapter VI allows for
recommendations to be made concerning the suitability of the
three data integrity models for a military environment. As
stated in Chapter I, the TCSEC does not contain a standard for
enforcement of data integrity. This void needs to be filled,
with the three data integrity models presented in this thesis
being candidates to fill that void. The goal of the framework
developed in Chapter V is to provide a method for producing
results that will lead to the recommendation of one model as
the most appropriate.
The application in Chapter VI of the framework points out
the potential benefits and drawbacks associated with each
model. The conclusions reached after analyzing each model
within the guidelines of the frame )rk are given below:
(1) While the IWG definitior integrity is accepted as
a standard for applicatio. .ithin the framework, there
is no agreement in either military or commercial
environments as to one acceptable definition to serve
as a standard. The primary reason for this is the
lack of research in the area of data integrity
[Ref. 12]. Because there exist situations in which
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unauthorized manipulation may be more harmful than
unauthorized disclosure, data integrity is very much
a concern in today's computer-based information
systems.
(2) There are distinct differences between commercial and
military computer environments. The commercial
environment is primarily concerned with preventing
manipulation of data, thereby preserving data
integrity, whereas the military environment has
traditionally been concerned with disclosure control.
These differences are best pointed out by the
Clark\Wilson model, which is based on concepts that
are compatible with both environments.
(3) There needs to be increased emphasis in the area of
developing the characteristics associated with the
term data integrity strictly within the military
environment. While it may not be possible to adopt
one standard definition, there need to be qualities
identified that can be universally applied to all
military applications. This is similar to the idea
that certain data is considered Top Secret for
disclosure purposes regardless of the context in which
it is used. Data that is used in a missile launching
system can be classified as Top Secret while different
data used in nuclear propulsion can likewise be
classified as Top Secret. The idea is that there is
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a universal classification of Top Secret, regardless
of the situation. This idea should be extended to
data integrity as well.
(4) The Clark\Wilson data integrity model is the most
appropriate model for incorporation into the TCSEC as
an integrity standard. The Clark\Wilson data
integrity model is recommended for the following
reasons:
a. Clark\Wilson has the most appropriate definition
for integrity. The integrity definition used in
this model is both adequate and complete in
respect to the IWG standard. It is sufficiently
broad for application in many different
environments, including the military environment.
Compared to the Biba and Goguen and Meseguer
integrity definitions, the Clark\Wilson definition
is applicable to a wider range of environments, to
include the military environment.
b. Clark\Wilson has a strong relation to secrecy.
The ability of the model to limit which data a
user can access serves to perform the function of
disclosure control. The separation of duties and
well-formed transaction concepts limit the ability
of any one user to perform all steps in a process.
This has the effect of preserving the integrity of
the data that is involved in the process.
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c. Clark\Wilson identifies the features of a system
in which integrity is the primary goal. The model
presents nine rules to implement in order to
safeguard the integrity of data used in the
system. These rules serve as a blueprint for
building an effective integrity enforcement
system.
d. Clark\Wilson has the potential for integrity
labelling similar to military information
classification labelling. Presently, this model
does not have the capability to attach integrity
labels. However, due to its ability to limit the
data that each user can access through the
separation of duties and well-formed transaction
concepts, the addition of this capability is
possible. The concepts on which the model is
based lend themselves to the addition of an
integrity label attachment capability.
It is noted that the Biba model is actually more suitable
than Clark\Wilson in this specific area. While Clark\Wilson
has potential for integrity labelling, Biba has a greater
potential for the successful implementation of labelling.
This is due to the relationship of the Biba model to the Bell-
LaPadula model for security.
e. Clazk\Wilson has no major limitations that cannot
be overcome. There are no areas of the model that
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are deficient enough to overshadow its advantages.
The limitations of the model, as described in
Chapters IV and VI, are not severe enough to
prohibit acceptance.
These conclusions are based on the ideas presented in the
appropriate chapters. The framework application in Chapter VI
provides the results which can be used to actually select one
data integrity model for implementation within military
computer environments.
B. RECOMM4ENDATIONS
Based on the conclusions stated in the above section, the
following recommendations are made:
(1) DoD should adopt an integrity model as a part of its
security policy. This integrity model should be
incorporated into the TCSEC to provide for a complete
security policy covering both disclosure control and
modification control.
(2) The Clark\Wilson data integrity model should be
accepted as the basis for an '.tegrity policy to be
incorporated into the TCSEC.
(3) The Clark\Wilson model should be expanded to include
the ability to attach integrity labels similar to the
security classification labels currently in use for
controlled military information.
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(4) The TCSEC should adopt a data integrity labelling
scheme similar to the scheme which is currently in use
for data security. There should be separate levels of
integrity classifications with all applicable data
identified as to its proper classification. These
integrity classifications should restrict both
manipulation and modification with mechanisms in place
to allow only authorized individuals such privileges.
While the integrity labels do not need to be exactly
the same as the Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential
used for security purposes they do need to have a
similar pattern. Labels such as High, Medium, and Low
are acceptable provided that the mechanism that
enforces integrity is capable of determining
authorized access requests from unauthorized requests.
There should be three data integrity levels to
correspond to the three data security levels.
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